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Abstract 
Using a data-set of OECD countries from 1980 to 2004, we assess the cross-
country evidence on the trade-off between wage inequality and employment 
performance by relying on Data Envelopment Analysis, a nonparametric 
technique usually employed in the analysis of productive efficiency. DEA allows 
for the simultaneous determination of inequality and employment and treats the 
potential trade-off between inequality and employment in a very flexible way. We 
attribute the variations in the rates of unemployment and non-employment to two 
components: the changes due to a variation in wage inequality along the 
inequality-employment trade-off and the changes in efficiency which 
simultaneously affect inequality and employment). We find that changes in 
efficiency are a fairly important component of total changes. 
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1. Introduction 
During the 1980s, the labour-market performance of most 
European countries showed clear signs of worsening vis-à-vis the US.1 
This situation was all the more surprising as it went against the 
experience of the previous two decades, when the US employment rate 
was consistently lower than that of most European countries (see Table 
1).  
 
Table 1 – Employment Rates in the US and Selected European Countries: 1964-2004 
 1964 1974 1984 1994 2004 
Austria 0.67 0.64 0.64 0.70 0.68 
Belgium 0.58 0.59 0.52 0.54 0.58 
Denmark 0.70 0.73 0.73 0.71 0.75 
Finland 0.73 0.70 0.72 0.60 0.68 
France 0.65 0.64 0.59 0.58 0.63 
Germany 0.68 0.66 0.60 0.67 0.69 
Italy 0.58 0.55 0.54 0.51 0.57 
Netherlands 0.67 0.64 0.54 0.66 0.74 
Norway 0.65 0.66 0.73 0.72 0.76 
Portugal 0.65 0.68 0.64 0.65 0.71 
Spain 0.57 0.58 0.45 0.46 0.61 
Sweden 0.72 0.75 0.79 0.70 0.72 
Continental Europe 
(unweighted average) 0.65 0.65 0.62 0.63 0.68 
UK 0.69 0.69 0.64 0.67 0.71 
US 0.60 0.64 0.67 0.71 0.71 
Source: AMECO database 
 
While some European countries have recently managed to improve their 
labour-market performance substantially, others appear to be still trapped 
at low employment rates. 
Also since the 1980s, wage inequality increased markedly in the 
US (and the UK), while the wage structure remained much more stable in 
most of continental Europe (see Table 2, where each entry gives the 
                                                 
1 Our preferred measure of labour-market performance is the employment rate. However, 
our conclusions would be substantially unchanged if we considered unemployment rates. 
As pointed out by Saint-Paul (2004), in recent years countries with high unemployment 
rates also tended to have low labour-force participation rates. 
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average annual percentage change in the ratio of the average wage in the 
9th decile to the average wage in the 1st decile for full-time workers). 
 
Table 2 – Wage Inequality in the US and Selected European Countries; 
Annual Percentage Changes; 1979-2000 
 men women all 
Austria -- -- -- 
Belgium -- -- -- 
Denmark -- --  0.1 
Finland  0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
France -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 
West Germany 0.9 -0.2 0.4 
Italy 1.6 -0.6 0.8 
Netherlands 0.9 0.2 0.6 
Norway -- -- -0.4 
Portugal -- -- -- 
Spain -- -- -- 
Sweden  0.6 0.7 0.5 
UK 1.3 1.2  0.7 
US 1.4 1.6 1.0 
Source: Glyn (2001) 
 
These diverging labour-market trends captured the attention of 
citizens and analysts from several countries. A “unified theory” (Blank, 
1997) centred on labour-market rigidities in Europe emerged to explain 
both the increase in US wage inequality and the rise in European 
unemployment. Attention in Europe was drawn to strong unions, 
restrictive employment protection legislation, generous social-safety nets 
and large tax wedges (Layard et al., 1991). More specifically, Krugman 
(1994), argued that technological change and globalization had altered 
the skill distribution of labour income in favour of relatively skilled 
workers. Hence, low unemployment rates could only be maintained at the 
price of a rising skill gap in wages (like in the US and the UK). 
Much has been written about these diverging trends, as well as 
about their recent evolution (Nickell, 2003; Saint-Paul, 2004; Freeman, 
2005). A consensus is emerging to the effect that there is no such a thing 
as a European labour-market problem, much of the unemployment in the 
EU being concentrated in four large countries: France, Germany, Italy 
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and Spain.2 Furthermore, it appears that the improvement of the labour-
market situation has not been accompanied in continental Europe by a 
rise in inequality comparable to that experienced by the US and the UK. 
Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) and Agell (1999), among others, have 
suggested that, in the presence of market failures, a more compressed 
wage structure can be conducive to lower unemployment. In particular, 
according to Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999a, 1999b) non-
competitive labour markets, by compressing wage structure, encourage 
firms to invest in general workers’ training. 
Let us examine in greater detail the cross-country evidence on the 
evolution of wage dispersion. Each entry in Table 3 gives the average 
annual percentage change in the ratio of the average wage in the 
numerator decile to the average wage in the denominator decile for all 
full-time workers. 
 
Table 3 – Wage Inequality in Upper and Lower Halves of the Distribution in the US 
and Selected European Countries; Annual Percentage Changes; 1979-2000 
 
9th decile / 1st 
decile 
9th decile / 5th 
decile 
5th decile / 1st 
decile 
Austria -- -- -- 
Belgium -- -- -- 
Denmark  0.1  0.3 -0.2 
Finland -0.2 0.1 -0.4 
France -0.3  0.0 -0.3 
West Germany 0.4  0.6 -0.2 
Italy 0.8  1.4 -0.6 
Netherlands 0.6  0.4  0.2 
Norway -0.4 0.3 -0.6 
Portugal -- -- -- 
Spain -- -- -- 
Sweden 0.5  0.2  0.3 
UK  0.7  0.6  0.1 
US 1.0  0.7  0.3 
Source: Glyn (2001) 
 
                                                 
2 Actually, the situation significantly improved in Spain and, to a lesser extent, in Italy 
(Garibaldi and Mauro, 2002). 
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Consider the second and third columns of Table 3, which 
decompose the change in overall wage dispersion into changes in upper-
half (9-5) and lower-half (5-1) dispersion. It turns out that most of the 
increase in overall wage dispersion arises from changes in its upper half. 
For Italy, France, and Germany, lower-half wage dispersion actually 
decreased. As pointed out by Atkinson (2003), the unified theory links 
technical change and globalization with reductions of relative wages in 
the lower half of wage distribution. We must conclude that there is more 
to trends in wage structures than implied by the unified theory. 
We try below to shed some light on these issues by taking stock 
of the available literature. First of all, we reassess Krugman’s view and 
find that, by itself, it does not provide a satisfactory explanation of trends 
in inequality and employment (Section 2). Then (in Section 3) we 
evaluate structural and institutional differences between the US and 
Europe. We concentrate on labour-market performance, but also extend 
our analysis beyond the labour markets non-standard (part-time and 
temporary) jobs. In Section 4 we propose an innovative research 
approach in order to shed light on the relationships between inquality and 
employment. We model them through the non-parametric analysis of 
production. Data and main results are presented in Section 5. Some 
concluding remarks cloose the paper (Section 6). 
 
2. Technological Change, Globalization and Inequality 
There appears to be considerable evidence in numerous OECD 
countries that the relative wage of skilled workers has increased, along 
with a rise in their relative employment levels (OECD, 1997). The 
magnitude of these changes, however, varies significantly from one 
country to another. There have been large increases in wage inequality in 
the US and in the UK, while other countries (especially those in 
continental Europe) have had more stable wage structures. 
In both the US and the EU, various studies provide evidence in 
favour of capital accumulation and technical change as the mainsprings 
of the skill upgrading that occurred in manufacturing during the 1980s. 
New technologies, embodied or disembodied in the capital stock, are 
skill-biased, either because of technological requirements or because of 
induced internal organizational changes in firms. Many papers (including, 
for the US, Bound and Johnson, 1992; Berman et al., 1994; and for 
several developed countries, Berman et al., 1998; Machin and Van 
Reenen, 1998) document the rising relative employment of skilled 
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workers within industries despite rising relative skilled wages. Various 
papers (Krueger, 1993; Berman et al., 1994; Autor et al., 1998) illustrate 
the correlation between skill upgrading and measures of technological 
change such as computerization and expenditures on research and 
development. However, cross-country evidence suggests that the demand 
for skilled workers increased during the last twenty years much more than 
their supply in the US and the UK, but not in other countries for which 
appropriate data are available (Layard and Nickell, 1999). 
The other oft-mentioned motive power of skill upgrading is the 
growth in international trade. Trade with countries having a comparative 
advantage in unskilled-labour-intensive production stimulates 
specialization in skill-intensive industries (between-industry effect). On 
the other hand, firms reorganize their activities by outsourcing to foreign 
countries (where labour is cheaper) the less skill-intensive tasks of 
production (a within-industry effect). The natural framework for 
analyzing the impact of trade on labour markets, at least from a 
maintained assumption of competitive markets, is the Stolper-Samuelson 
theorem and its various generalizations. Krugman (1995) concludes that 
the effect on unskilled wages in developed nations of plausible levels of 
increased trade with developing countries is small (but negative), and is 
swamped by other, positive effects. Leamer (1998) and Feenstra and 
Hanson (1999) extend this framework to incorporate technological 
change. Leamer concludes that technological change dominated price 
changes in the 1980s, while the reverse was true for the 1970s. Feenstra 
and Hanson find that only under assumptions of exogenous commodity 
prices and exogenous sector-specific wage differentials does outsourcing 
play a large role in generating wage inequality. 
The conclusion that the impact of globalization on the rising skill 
premium is negligible may be sensitive, however, to the competitive-
markets assumption. Studies allowing for imperfect competition 
generally find that increased trade has played some role in the 
deterioration of the relative wage of unskilled labour (Gaston and Nelson, 
2000). Globalization is thought to have reduced union density and the 
bargaining power of trade unions, leading to higher wage inequality 
(OECD, 1997). We will come back to this point in Section 3.  
Finally, most studies of the effect of immigration on wage 
inequality have found extremely small effects. Borjas (1994) concludes 
that there is no evidence that immigrants have had an adverse impact on 
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the earnings and employment of native workers. This conclusion has been 
subsequently upheld by Borjas et al. (1997) and Friedberg (2001). 
A further distinctive point of the unified theory is that 
unemployment remained fairly low for high-skilled workers, while it 
increased considerably for less-skilled groups. Krugman (1994) points to 
the rise in relative unemployment rates for unskilled workers in Europe. 
However, Nickell and Bell (1995) examine trends in relative 
unemployment rates by quartile in the skill distribution, and note that 
relative unemployment rates by skill show similar trends across 
industrialized countries and within the OECD. Further light on this issue 
can be shed by Figure 1, where changes in the wage structure are 
considered in conjunction with changes in the employment distribution. 
 
Fig. 1 – Labour-market Inequality in the US and Selected European Countries; 
1979-2000 
The Trade-Off in the 1980s
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The Trade-Off in the 1990s
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If growing wage dispersion actually was the main influence upon 
the evolution of employment dispersion, there should be a negative 
relationship among changes in wage and in employment inequality. 
However, no significant correlation between these two variables emerges 
from Fig. 1, shedding much doubt on the unified theory argument that 
rising wage dispersion was the necessary price to pay for a high unskilled 
employment rate. This evidence is supported by the more detailed 
comparisons carried out in Card et al. (1999) and in Freeman and 
Schettkat (2001a). 
In the following sections we consider in greater detail some of the 
factors most often mentioned in the literature as contributing to poor 
labour-market performance in Europe, probing more deeply the alleged 
relationship between wage inequality and labour-market performance. 
 
3. Labour-market Performance and Institutions  
A sizable empirical literature is consistent with the view that 
unions raise wages and, in most OECD countries, trade unions are highly 
relevant in wage negotiations. As shown in Layard and Nickell (1999, p. 
3041, Table 7), even if union density (the percentage of workers who 
belong to a trade union) is very low, union coverage (the percentage of 
workers covered by a collective agreement) can be substantial. A very 
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important aspect of collective wage agreements is the extent to which 
unions and/or firms coordinate their actions. Coordination is distinct from 
centralization, which strictly identifies the most dominant level at which 
wages are negotiated, plant, firm, industry, or economy. Obviously, 
nationwide wage agreements must be highly coordinated, but highly 
coordinated bargaining need not be centralized. There are well-known 
and established country rankings of bargaining coordination and 
centralization (Layard and Nickell, 1999, p. 3041, Table 7, provide 
various indices of union and employers’ coordination). Clear cross-
country patterns do emerge: the Scandinavian countries and Austria have 
the most coordinated and centralized systems, followed by continental 
Europe and Japan. By contrast, Anglo-Saxon countries have largely non-
coordinated systems, despite having appreciably higher levels of union 
density and coverage in general. 
Wages set nationwide are more responsive to variations in 
aggregate labour-market conditions if wage agreements are highly 
coordinated. On the other hand, if wage agreements are less coordinated 
or less centralized, firm or industry wages are more responsive to specific 
shocks. It follows that highly coordinated or centralized wage agreements 
may compress the distribution of wages too much relative to the 
distribution of skills (OECD, 1997, Ch. 3, Table 3.B.1). A recent and 
complete survey (Aidt and Tzannatos, 2003, Ch. 5) concludes that, on the 
whole, coordinated bargaining provides better macroeconomic outcomes 
than decentralized bargaining. This is consistent with the results from 
wage equations estimated over recent samples, according to which real-
wage flexibility is highest in continental Europe (Cadiou et al., 1999; 
Peeters and Den Reijer, 2003). Indeed these results even suggest that a 
significant increase in the degree of real-wage flexibility took place in 
countries (among which Italy and the Netherlands) where the use of 
incomes policies contributed to raise bargaining coordination. It thus 
appears that strong unions, when in conjunction with coordinated 
bargaining, can achieve a satisfactory labour-market performance with a 
stable wage structure. In this sense, the spontaneous move toward 
decentralization that has been characterizing European industrial relations 
in the last decade (Calmfors, 1999) should be evaluated with care. 
Channelling this evolution within the bounds of economy-wide 
coordinated bargaining seems a noteworthy policy priority.  
Among the other factors believed to have hampered labour-
market performance in continental Europe during the 1970s and the 
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1980s, generous social-safety nets are perhaps most often blamed. In the 
US, lifetime entitlements to cash assistance for employable nonworking 
adults were eliminated in August 1996. The Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families (TANF) programme replaced the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC). However, many features (time limitations, 
work requirements, etc.) that ultimately became part of the federal law 
had already been introduced by a number of individual US states prior to 
1996. Other notable changes in the US included the expansion of the 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the early 1990s. As individual US 
states experimented with welfare-to-work programmes throughout the 
late 1980s and the 1990s, many of these policy measures were evaluated 
through randomized assessments. The resulting evidence points to the 
effectiveness of welfare-to-work programmes in reducing welfare costs 
and increasing labour supply (most of the evidence is summed up in 
Bloom and Michalopolous, 2001). The EITC proved in particular to be an 
effective policy measure also because, being tied into the tax system, it 
can be limited to low-wage workers in low-income families, rather than 
being extended to all low-wage workers. 
Also within Europe, labour-market performance has improved 
following either the shortening of the unemployment-benefit entitlement 
period or the enforcement of a stricter entitlement test. The experience of 
welfare-to-work programmes in Northern European countries, assessed in 
de Koning et al. (2004), is particularly relevant in this respect. However, 
in Nordic countries (as opposed to the UK), this experience has not 
dented a commitment to income equality, which has been enacted not 
only through the fiscal system, but also through active labour-market 
policies and generous unemployment benefits (Fischer and Matthiessen, 
2005). In the US the EITC came along with an increase in minimum 
wages, and, child-care assistance and the availability of health insurance 
to low-income families became more generous during the 1990s. 
Several recent studies (including Prescott, 2004) argue that higher 
European income and payroll tax rates help explain why hours of work 
are significantly lower in Europe. However, the bulk of the empirical 
labour-supply literature suggests that tax rates can explain only a small 
part of this difference (Alesina et al., 2005). In Europe, an influential 
study by Daveri and Tabellini (2000) found that virtually all the rise in 
European equilibrium unemployment rates was to be ascribed to 
increasing payroll taxes. However, according to Layard and Nickell 
(1999), a reasonable estimate would imply that a 5% reduction in the tax 
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wedge (including income, consumption and payroll taxes) lowers the 
unemployment rate from 8% to 7%. Nickell (2003) concludes that there 
is considerable uncertainty about the impact of these taxes on 
unemployment. Indeed, lower taxes (as well as weaker employment 
protection) are unlikely to bring about sizable reductions in the 
unemployment rate, especially if coordinated wage bargaining reduces 
real-wage resistance. 
During the last two decades employment protection legislation 
has been extensively modified in most European countries. However this 
was not so much true within regular employment as in the field of 
temporary employment and fixed-term contracts. As a consequence, 
reforms in employment flexibility mostly consisted in favouring the 
development of non-standard forms of employment. Generally speaking, 
empirical support for an impact of strict labour-market regulations on 
labour-market performance appears to be weak. Since employment 
protection legislation reduces both job destruction and job creation, the 
relation between protection and unemployment is theoretically 
ambiguous. The existing evidence (OECD, 2002, 2004) suggests that 
stricter employment protection does not raise aggregate unemployment, 
while increasing the duration of unemployment and reducing worker 
turnover. There is some evidence that employment protection legislation 
lowers employment rates for youth and women, while increasing them for 
prime-age men. These relationships however fade away when allowance 
is made for various control variables. The same reasoning applies for 
temporary jobs, whose development equally favours both job creation 
and job destruction (Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002). There is no 
consistent evidence either of an association between aggregate 
employment rates and the incidence of part-time work (Garibaldi and 
Mauro, 2002).  
In order to fully account for diverging labour-market trends, we 
surmise that structural and institutional differences between the US and 
Europe should also be evaluated outside the labour market. This brings us 
to examine the role of industrial structure and the housing sector. 
Services generally are less open to international competition, and 
this has strongly contributed to their faster employment growth. 
Naturally, the key question is what has stopped the reallocation of labour 
from declining to growing industries in EU countries? In this regard, it is 
interesting to consider the arguments by Hopenhayn and Rogerson 
(1993), Bertola (1994), and Saint-Paul (2002). According to them, strict 
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employment protection laws either slow down labour reallocation from 
declining to expanding sectors or they encourage specialization in the 
production of declining-sector goods. Yet, as pointed out by Layard and 
Nickell (1999, p. 3063), these arguments apply only to the closure of old 
plants and the opening of new ones since, by just relying on quits, 
continuing firms can reduce employment by up to 10% per annum. 
Moreover, although these arguments may carry some weight, they do not 
address the structural differences between Europe and the US in the 
relative growth of the service sector. 
An arguably more promising route focuses on economy-wide 
(screening procedures, tax-related requirements for start-ups) and sectoral 
regulations (zoning laws or restrictions on shop-opening hours). The 
stringency of entry regulations appears to be negatively associated with 
employment rates (Nicoletti et al., 2001) and entrepreneurial activity 
(Fonseca et al., 2001) across OECD countries. At the sectoral level, 
Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) find that entry regulation hinders job 
creation in the French retail sector.  
In the presence of economy-wide entry regulations, the market 
price of services and rents in the economy increase, triggering a reduction 
in labour supply. This provides a rationale for the negative association 
between product-market regulations and the employment rate found in 
the literature, and is also consistent with the gap in the marketisation of 
service activities between the US and European economies found by 
Freeman and Schettkat (2001b). Accordingly, European households 
respond to tighter entry regulations by substituting away from the 
purchase of services in the market (child-care, home repairs and leisure 
activities) and towards home production while Americans, facing lower 
service prices, supply more hours of work purchasing equivalent services 
in the market. The simulations in Messina (2005a) show that economy-
wide regulatory barriers to entry obstruct the natural pattern of structural 
change, hindering the development of those sectors whose demand is 
income elastic. Thus, countries with tighter restrictions on entry are 
expected to have a relatively underdeveloped service sector. This 
negative relationship persists even after controlling for a wide range of 
factors which might also shape cross-country differences in industrial 
structure (Messina, 2005b). 
It could be asked whether after all a rise in wage inequality is a 
prerequisite for an increase in service employment. Iversen and Wren 
(1998) suggest that equality is likely to reduce employment growth in 
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private consumer-oriented services, because productivity in these 
industries is low and slow-growing. Iversen and Wren find some 
empirical support for this proposition, but neither Kenworthy (2003) not 
Messina (2005b) are able to fully replicate these results. They find either 
weak or insignificant effects for wage inequality, once other explanatory 
variables are included in the estimates. 
Barriers to geographical mobility are clearly an obstacle to the 
efficient functioning of the labour market. Layard and Nickell (1999, 
Table 13, p. 3047) provide convincing prima facie evidence that 
geographical mobility is lowest in southern Europe and highest in the US 
and the Scandinavian countries. Oswald (1997) suggests that home 
ownership is an important barrier to geographical mobility, as the 
propensity to move may be lower for homeowners, who have to liquidate 
their housing assets in a given locality to buy a new house elsewhere, 
thus facing sizeable transaction costs. If owning a house reduces 
geographical mobility, the consequences for the labour market of 
secularly rising homeownership could be profound. Could the rise in 
homeownership be part of the high European unemployment story? 
Levels of homeownership and unemployment rates are surprisingly 
highly correlated across countries and throughout time. Moreover, 
countries with the fastest growth in homeownership had the most rapid 
growth in unemployment (Oswald, 1997). Supportive evidence is also 
reported by Belot and Van Ours (2004), who carry out an empirical 
analysis for a panel of OECD countries. 
 
4. The Empirical Approach 
Although the unified theory does not seem able to fully grasp the 
relationships between wage inequality and employment performance, 
there seems to be some prima facie evidence on the existence of a trade-
off between these two magnitudes. In order to see this, Bertola (2004) 
suggests to consider wage inequality and employment (or 
unemployment), once fixed country- and common time effects are taken 
away from the data. A trade-off then emerges, suggesting that in less 
regulated labour markets there is higher inequality, but less 
unemployment (or non-employment).  
 
  19
Fig. 2a. The Employment-Inequality Nexus (Bertola, 2004) 
 
 
 
Fig. 2b. The Unemployment-Inequality Trade-off (Bertola, 2004) 
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Bertola (2005) hastens to add that the trade-off in Figs. 2a and 2b 
is not very steep, and that most of the employment performance is driven 
by country- and common time effects. In this paper, we follow this line of 
reasoning, comparing the progress in employment performance that can 
be bought at the price of higher inequality with efficiency gains that can 
profit both employment and equality. To do this we rely on the non-
parametric analysis of production frontiers. 
More precisely, we apply frontier analysis to a production set 
where wage inequality and unemployment (or non-employment) are 
taken as inputs (they are “bads”), once allowance is made for fixed 
country- and common time effects. In a second step of the analysis 
various indicators of supply-side structure are correlated with the 
technical efficiency scores (the distance from the frontier) and the ratio 
between the input shadow prices (the slope of the frontier, or marginal 
rate of substitution). The frontier is estimated through the non-parametric 
technique known as DEA: this technique easily deals with a multi-input 
multi-output set-up, does not incur in any simultaneity problems, and 
does not make any restrictive assumption about functional form (and then 
on the eventual interactions between the target variables and their 
exogenous determinants). Also, the non-parametric approach easily 
allows for high behavioural heterogeneity (that is, in the trade-off) across 
time and countries. Within the non-parametric approach, DEA is to be 
preferred,3 since we are highly interested in calculating shadow prices. 
Indeed, these shadow prices allow to assess empirically which is the 
relative weight policymakers put upon the variability of  inflation and of 
the level of activity. A graphical illustration of the DEA approach is 
provided in Fig. 3. 
 
                                                 
3 A very recent and complete introduction to DEA is given in Cooper et al. (2000). 
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Fig. 3. The DEA Trade-off 
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and its frontier is characterised by variable returns to scale. The input-
saving efficiency measure DFI of the i-th observation, λi, is obtained from 
the input-oriented model BCCP-I):4 
 
BCCP-I (xi, yi): 
N...,1,j1,0,λ
K...,1,k, xγxλ
M...,1,m ,y  γy
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Usually, observations are dominated by convex combinations of efficient 
observations situated on the frontier. The identification problem has been 
above formulated in its envelopment form. The dual expression, the 
multiplier form, is: 
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providing information on the shadow prices νi and μi; the ratios among 
the latter are the input and output marginal rates of substitution. 
The main drawback of DEA is that it does not straightforwardly 
allow for stochastic noise in the data. A consequence of this is that DEA 
                                                 
4 Formally, an output-oriented model can be set up, and output-increasing efficiency 
measures obtained. However, in the present context we need be interested only in the 
input-oriented model. 
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is very sensitive to the presence of outliers. The latter are particularly 
relevant if they are situated on the frontier of the production set. In order 
to ascertain their existence, we compute for all efficient observations the 
so-called super-efficiency scores – indicating the maximum radial 
contraction consistent with the observation remaining efficient (see for 
instance unit C in Fig. 4). Super-efficiency scores greater than 1.5 are 
likely to be associated with an outlier. In this case one must decide 
whether the efficiency scores must be recalculated excluding such an 
observation from the production set. In taking this decision it is useful to 
consider Tørgensen’ rho (Tørgersen et al., 1996) which measures the 
importance of a reference unit for the efficiency potential of the 
inefficient units. A high (>0.10-0.15) value of the rho indicates that an 
efficient observation is important as a benchmark for other observations. 
Hence a combination of high super-efficiency scores and rho’s singles 
out outliers that should be excluded from the production set. 
 
Fig. 4. Super-efficiency 
 C 
A 
B 
 
 
 
5. Data and Results 
The empirical application here provided relates to the measurement 
of labour-market performance during the 1980-2004 period in a sample 
of 21 OECD countries. More details on the sample are provided in Table 
4. 
Rate of 
Unemployment  
(or Non-employment) 
Wage Inequality 
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Table 4 –The Sample 
 
SET N obs
Set 1 336
Set 3 310
Set 2 338
Set 4 312
 
Data about wage inequality are taken from the OECD database on 
Trends in Earnings Dispersion. Data on unemployment, employment, 
labour force and population are taken from the AMECO Eurostat 
database. Data about supply-side structure and institutions are mainly 
taken from Nickell (2006) with some interpolations from OECD sources. 
We use a pooled sample. Changes in the “state of technology” 
can be tested through the significance of time (either pulse or shift) 
dummies. We consider four different “production sets”. Output is simply 
taken to be the management service provided by the countries' helmsmen. 
Under some simple assumptions this implies that the output vector 
collapses to a scalar of value one for every country in every year. Inputs 
(or “bads”) are respectively: 
 
SET 1: rate of unemployment, ratio of the average wage in the 9th 
decile to the average wage in the 1st decile for all full-time 
workers. 
SET 2: rate of non-employment (1 – civilian employment/ 
working age population), ratio of the average wage in the 9th 
decile to the average wage in the 1st decile for all full-time 
workers. 
SET 3: rate of unemployment, ratio of the average wage in the 5th 
decile to the average wage in the 1st decile for male full-time 
workers. 
SET 4: rate of non-employment (1 – civilian 
employment/working age population), ratio of the average wage 
in the 5th decile to the average wage in the 1st decile for male full-
time workers. 
 
Using both the rates of unemployment and non-employment is 
justified mainly on the grounds of getting more robust evidence. If results 
were to widely diverge across these two measures, we would probably 
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conclude that there is some unaccounted heterogeneity in the estimates. 
On the other hand, the previous discussion has made it clear that it could 
be interesting to contrast traditional measures of wage dispersion with 
measures more narrowly focused on the lower end of the wage 
distribution (5th decile to 1st decile). 
In order to minimise the impact of stochastic noise, we use 
smooth all time series (country by country) using the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter. As was clarified in Section 4, our input variables are first regressed 
on a set of common time (year) and country dummies. Then, DEA is 
applied on the residuals from those regressions. Computation of the 
super-efficiency scores makes it quite apparent that sets 1-4 contain some 
outliers, which are detailed in Table 5.  
 
Table 5 – Anomalous observations 
SET 1 SET 2 SET 3 SET 4 
Ireland 1999 Ireland 1998 Ireland 2000 Ireland 1998 
Spain 2000 Ireland 1999 Spain 2002 Ireland 1999 
Spain 2002 Ireland 2000 Spain 2003 Ireland 2000 
Spain 2003 Spain 2002 Switzerland 2003 Spain 2002 
Spain 2004 Spain 2003 Switzerland 2004 Spain 2003 
USA 1980 Spain 2004 USA 1980 Spain 2004 
USA 1981 USA 1980  Switzerland 2003 
USA 1982 USA 1981  Switzerland 2004 
 USA 1982  USA 1980 
 
There is clearly a pattern in the presence of outliers, which are 
concentrated infour countries and in given years. We decide then that it is 
best to exclude them from the subsequent analysis. We report in the 
Appendix the main results. 
In Tables A.1 and A.2 we respectively give the fixed country-
effects for efficiency scores and marginal rates of substitution between 
un- or non-employment and wage inequality. We find significant cross-
country differences in both variables. However, as shown in Table A.3, 
marginal rates of substitution tend to gather in all sets around a high and a 
low value. Indeed, the DEA frontiers are characterised by few changes in 
slope. 
In Tables A.4 and A.5 we proceed to attribute the (absolute) 
variations in the rates of unemployment and non-employment in our 
sample to two components: the changes due to a variation in wage 
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inequality along the frontier (and then attributable to the inequality-
employment trade-off) and the changes in efficiency (which 
simultaneously affect inequality and employment). We find that changes 
in efficiency are a fairly important component of total predicted changes. 
We hence conclude that neglecting them potentially clouds the analysis 
of labour-market performance. Note that, although the differences 
between actual and predicted changes (the residuals) are sometimes very 
large, they obey to roughly symmetrical distributions, thus showing the 
lack of systematic bias in our analysis. 
Finally, in Tables A.6-A.9 we explore the relationships between 
the efficiency scores, the marginal rates of substitution and various 
indicators of supply-side structure. From Table A.6 it turns out that high 
marginal rates of substitution (associated to relatively low inequality and 
employment) are rather consistently associated to low employment 
protection legislation, lack of coordination and high union density and tax 
rates. Table A.7 takes advantage of the distribution of marginal rates of 
substitution mainly around two values in order to repeat the former 
exercise in a logit framework. Very similar results emerge. High marginal 
rates of substitution are associated to low employment legislation, lack of 
coordination and high union density and tax rates,as well as with high 
benefit replacement ratio and low home ownership. Most of these signs 
agree with received wisdom. However, it is not immediately clear why 
low inequality and employment should be associated with low 
employment protection and home ownership. 
Table A.8 highlights that, if anything, a negative relationship 
exists between high marginal rates and efficiency. The explanation of the 
latter is considered in Table A.9. Higher efficiency is associated with 
higher employment protection legislation, union coverage and bargaining 
coordination and with lower taxation rates. There is also some positive 
correlation between benefit replacement ratio and duration and efficiency. 
All in all, the results from Tables A.6-A.9 are not immediately 
understandable. Certainly they do not endorse the unified view, but 
neither do they fully support an alternative view stressing the role of 
factors outside the labour market. Arguably a richer set of covariates 
(also including indexes of demographic and industrial composition) 
should be considered before drawing policy conclusions from this kind of 
exercise. 
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2. Concluding Remarks 
 
In the early 1990s a “unified theory” centred on labour-market 
rigidities in Europe emerged to explain both the increase in US wage 
inequality and the rise in European unemployment. After more than ten 
years, it turns out that matters are not that simple, the trade-off between 
inequality and labour-market performance proving to be rather elusive. 
After considering in some detail various factors mentioned in the 
literature, we try to shed light on this issue adopting a relatively novel 
approach. 
We assess the cross-country evidence on the trade-off between 
wage inequality and employment performance by relying on Data 
Envelopment Analysis, a nonparametric technique usually employed in 
the analysis of productive efficiency. Using DEA allows for the 
simultaneous determination of inequality and employment, assesses the 
potential trade-off between inequality and employment in a very flexible 
way, and is to a great extent robust with respect the potential endogeneity 
of some institutional variables (social safety nets, etc.). We consider a 
data-set of OECD countries from 1980 to 2004. 
Our main findings can be summed up as follows. We attribute the 
variations in the rates of unemployment and non-employment to two 
components: the changes due to a variation in wage inequality along the 
inequality-employment trade-off and the changes in efficiency which 
simultaneously affect inequality and employment). We find that changes 
in efficiency are a fairly important component of total changes. 
Neglecting them is then likely to bias  the analysis of labour-market 
performance. We also explore the relationships between the efficiency 
scores, the marginal rates of substitution and various indicators of supply-
side structure, but do not find wholly understandable results. Arguably a 
richer set of covariates (also including indexes of demographic and 
industrial composition) should be considered before drawing policy 
conclusions from this kind of exercise. 
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Appendix 
 
TABLE A.1 – Efficiency Scores: Country Effects (full regression given in table A.9) 
 
 SET 1 SET 2 SET 3 SET 4 
Australia 0.61 0.66 0.55 0.68 
Austria 0.59 0.67 0.53 0.69 
Belgium 0.65 0.68 0.60 0.74 
Canada 0.65 0.72 0.60 0.77 
Denmark 0.63 0.68 0.57 0.79 
Finland 0.72 0.76 0.68 0.76 
France 0.64 0.69 0.57 0.69 
Germany 0.63 0.66 0.63 0.74 
Greece 0.54 0.58 0.56 0.65 
Ireland 0.52 0.60 0.56 0.67 
Italy 0.59 0.64 0.53 0.67 
Japan 0.65 0.71 0.56 0.71 
Netherlands 0.62 0.67 0.62 0.72 
New Zealand 0.64 0.68 0.56 0.68 
Norway 0.64 0.64 -- -- 
Portugal 0.71 0.73 0.53 0.65 
Spain 0.57 0.60 0.66 0.71 
Sweden 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.64 
Switzerland 0.76 0.66 0.52 0.72 
UK 0.62 0.70 0.53 0.69 
USA 0.60 0.68 0.56 0.67 
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TABLE A.2 – Marg. Rates of Substitution: Country Effects (full regression given in 
table A.6) 
 
 SET 1 SET 2 SET 3 SET 4 
Australia 57.13 18.31 115.36 67.98 
Austria 53.24 10.21 106.81 66.05 
Belgium 50.54 0.81 100.92 15.85 
Canada 50.78 0.60 103.61 36.75 
Denmark 57.13 24.44 104.87 78.49 
Finland 31.63 22.61 51.36 75.79 
France 48.07 19.84 93.18 46.54 
Germany 55.17 20.56 85.33 26.15 
Greece 46.40 17.81 65.99 34.66 
Ireland 44.20 18.31 74.35 54.39 
Italy 56.91 10.21 113.61 246.59 
Japan 58.90 0.81 115.36 86.92 
Netherlands 43.84 0.60 64.93 57.26 
New Zealand 49.96 24.44 95.89 51.24 
Norway 51.22 22.61 -- -- 
Portugal 36.12 19.84 29.28 21.37 
Spain 21.47 20.56 65.14 156.76 
Sweden 31.86 21.37 31.87 60.83 
Switzerland 12.83 20.54 124.82 90.97 
UK 57.13 16.77 77.37 154.91 
USA 35.26 12.84 74.35 51.04 
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TABLE A.3 – High and Low Marginal Rates of Substitution: Group Medians 
 
SET 1 
 Freq. Percent
Low values (median) 10.61 59 17.61
High values (median) 67.85 276 82.39
N. obs  335
 
SET 2 
 Freq. Percent
Low values (median) 7.29 205 61.38
High values (median) 45.60 130 38.62
N. obs  334
 
SET 3 
 Freq. Percent
Low values (median) 24.17 66 21.15
High values (median) 135.03 246 78.85
N. obs  312
 
SET 4 
 Freq. Percent
Low values (median) 20.39 217 70
High values (median) 109.70 93 30
N. obs  310
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TABLE A.4 –The Variations in the Rates of Unemployment and Non-Employment: the Inequality Trade-off and Changes in Efficiency – Sets 1 and 2 
 
country 
 
9th decile / 1st 
decile 
W -ratio 
(abs. changes) 
 
Rate of Non-
Employment
(abs. changes)
Actual
(0)
Efficiency - set 1
(perc. changes)
Rate of Non-
Employment
(abs. changes)
due toTrade-off
(1)
Rate of Non-
Employment
(abs. changes)
due to
Eff. Changes
(2)
Rate of Non-
Employment
(abs. changes)
Predicted
(1+2)
Rate of Non-
Employment
(abs. changes)
Residual
(0)-(1+2)
Australia 0.00 -0.76 0.07 -0.11 -0.61 -0.72 -0.04
Austria 0.06 -5.32 0.19 -3.59 -1.94 -5.53 0.21
Belgium 0.00 0.47 -0.08 -0.16 0.68 0.52 -0.05
Canada 0.02 -1.33 -0.04 -1.08 0.35 -0.73 -0.60
Denmark 0.01 1.83 -0.27 -0.71 2.43 1.71 0.12
Finland -0.19 8.02 0.08 7.87 -0.31 7.56 0.46
France -0.13 3.79 0.28 7.89 -1.26 6.63 -2.84
Germany -0.01 -2.98 0.54 0.45 -4.57 -4.12 1.13
Greece 0.00 -1.04 0.06 -0.33 -0.46 -0.80 -0.25
Ireland -0.30 -7.05 1.70 17.79 -14.13 3.65 -10.70
Italy -0.03 3.50 -0.08 1.83 0.53 2.36 1.14
Japan -0.08 0.78 0.94 5.36 -8.88 -3.52 4.30
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Netherlands 0.33 -9.51 0.60 -17.54 -5.13 -22.68 13.17
New Zlnd -0.02 4.77 -0.53 1.05 2.26 3.31 1.46
Norway 0.00 1.75 -0.19 0.04 0.85 0.89 0.86
Portugal 0.03 0.87 -0.38 -1.68 4.03 2.35 -1.48
Spain -0.24 -9.92 1.81 7.22 -18.63 -11.41 1.50
Sweden -0.14 10.79 -0.33 5.83 1.20 7.02 3.76
Switzerland -0.01 2.90 -0.36 0.41 3.91 4.33 -1.43
UK 0.03 0.60 -0.33 -2.03 2.62 0.59 0.01
USA 0.16 -1.17 -0.55 -8.22 6.41 -1.81 0.64
MEDIAN 0.00 0.60 -0.04 0.04 0.35 0.59 0.21
MEAN -0.02 0.05 0.15 0.97 -1.46 -0.49 0.54
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country 
 
9th decile / 1st 
decile 
W-ratio 
(abs. changes) 
 
Rate of Un-
Employment
(abs. changes)
Actual
(0)
Efficiency - set 2
(perc. changes)
Rate of Un-
Employment
(abs. changes)
due toTrade-off
(1)
Rate of Un-
Employment
(abs. changes)
due to
Eff. Changes
(2)
Rate of Un-
Employment
(abs. changes)
Predicted
(1+2)
Rate of Un-
Employment
(abs. changes)
Residual
(0)-(1+2)
Australia 0.00 -1.34 0.17 -0.04 -1.14 -1.18 -0.16
Austria 0.06 -0.56 0.06 -0.74 -0.34 -1.08 0.52
Belgium 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.20 0.18 -0.22
Canada 0.02 -0.10 -0.03 -0.12 0.14 0.03 -0.13
Denmark 0.01 -2.13 -0.06 -0.30 0.48 0.18 -2.31
Finland -0.19 2.56 0.15 5.00 -0.70 4.30 -1.74
France -0.13 1.93 0.18 3.24 -0.96 2.28 -0.35
Germany -0.01 3.55 0.06 0.17 -0.46 -0.29 3.83
Greece 0.00 -0.53 0.04 -0.22 -0.31 -0.54 0.01
Ireland -0.30 -6.56 1.02 2.16 -5.54 -3.38 -3.18
Italy -0.03 1.24 -0.07 0.39 0.59 0.98 0.26
Japan -0.08 2.01 0.67 6.60 -4.88 1.72 0.29
Netherlands 0.33 -5.89 0.30 -9.42 -2.61 -12.03 6.14
  34
New Zlnd -0.02 0.91 -0.33 0.46 1.60 2.06 -1.15
Norway 0.00 1.43 -0.19 0.00 0.99 0.99 0.44
Portugal 0.03 1.54 -0.34 -0.82 3.01 2.19 -0.65
Spain -0.24 -5.24 1.27 1.78 -9.22 -7.43 2.19
Sweden -0.14 2.16 -0.15 3.51 0.88 4.39 -2.23
Switzerland -0.01 3.00 -0.33 0.40 2.83 3.23 -0.23
UK 0.03 -3.34 -0.01 -0.63 0.10 -0.53 -2.82
USA 0.16 -3.02 -0.42 -3.47 4.17 0.70 -3.72
MEDIAN 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.10 0.18 -0.22
MEAN -0.02 -0.40 0.09 0.38 -0.53 -0.15 -0.25
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TABLE A.5 –The Variations in the Rates of Unemployment and Non-Employment: the Inequality Trade-off and Changes in Efficiency – Sets 3 and 4 
 
country 
 
5th decile / 1st 
decile 
W -ratio 
(abs. changes) 
 
Rate of Non-
Employment
(abs. changes)
Actual
(0)
Efficiency - set 3
(perc. changes)
Rate of Non-
Employment
(abs. changes)
due toTrade-off
(1)
Rate of Non-
Employment
(abs. changes)
due to
Eff. Changes
(2)
Rate of Non-
Employment
(abs. changes)
Predicted
(1+2)
Rate of Non-
Employment
(abs. changes)
Residual
(0)-(1+2)
Australia 0.00 -0.76 0.01 -0.38 -0.08 -0.46 -0.30
Austria 0.03 -5.32 0.35 -3.05 -2.50 -5.54 0.22
Belgium 0.01 0.47 -0.24 -1.01 1.88 0.87 -0.40
Canada -0.01 -1.33 0.47 0.91 -4.17 -3.26 1.93
Denmark 0.01 2.21 -0.35 -1.05 1.99 0.94 1.27
Finland -0.07 8.02 -0.21 18.92 0.76 19.68 -11.66
France -0.06 3.79 0.08 6.24 -0.35 5.88 -2.09
Germany 0.05 -2.98 -0.31 -5.90 2.62 -3.28 0.30
Greece -0.02 -1.04 0.04 3.05 -0.34 2.71 -3.75
Ireland -0.07 -7.05 1.40 6.23 -11.60 -5.37 -1.68
Italy -0.04 3.50 0.09 4.74 -0.64 4.09 -0.59
Japan -0.01 0.78 0.62 1.30 -5.80 -4.50 5.28
Netherlands 0.20 -13.25 0.35 -52.54 -1.93 -54.48 41.23
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New Zlnd 0.03 4.77 -0.56 -4.05 2.38 -1.67 6.44
Portugal -0.04 0.87 0.50 3.27 -1.78 1.49 -0.61
Spain -0.10 -9.92 2.01 4.48 -21.21 -16.73 6.81
Sweden 0.00 10.79 -0.44 0.16 1.58 1.74 9.04
Switzerland -0.12 2.90 0.63 8.07 -6.95 1.12 1.78
UK 0.02 0.60 -0.53 -3.16 4.22 1.07 -0.47
USA -0.06 -1.17 -0.48 6.17 5.62 11.78 -12.95
MEDIAN -0.01 0.53 0.06 1.10 -0.35 0.91 -0.04
MEAN -0.01 -0.21 0.17 -0.38 -1.82 -2.20 1.99
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country 
 
5th decile / 1st 
decile 
W-ratio 
(abs. changes) 
 
Rate of Un-
Employment
(abs. changes)
Actual
(0)
Efficiency - set 4
(perc. changes)
Rate of Un-
Employment
(abs. changes)
due toTrade-off
(1)
Rate of Un-
Employment
(abs. changes)
due to
Eff. Changes
(2)
Rate of Un-
Employment
(abs. changes)
Predicted
(1+2)
Rate of Un-
Employment
(abs. changes)
Residual
(0)-(1+2)
Australia 0.00 -1.34 0.14 -0.73 -0.93 -1.66 0.32
Austria 0.03 -0.56 0.09 -0.03 -0.60 -0.63 0.07
Belgium 0.01 -0.04 -0.12 -0.91 0.74 -0.17 0.13
Canada -0.01 -0.10 0.20 0.70 -1.19 -0.49 0.39
Denmark 0.01 0.95 -0.25 -0.56 1.44 0.89 0.06
Finland -0.07 2.56 -0.10 5.61 0.48 6.10 -3.54
France -0.06 1.93 0.04 3.95 -0.22 3.73 -1.80
Germany 0.05 3.55 -0.46 -1.79 3.32 1.52 2.02
Greece -0.02 -0.53 0.03 0.46 -0.19 0.27 -0.80
Ireland -0.07 -6.56 0.85 2.06 -4.65 -2.59 -3.97
Italy -0.04 1.24 0.04 1.41 -0.31 1.10 0.15
Japan -0.01 2.01 0.49 1.31 -3.53 -2.22 4.23
Netherlands 0.20 -4.61 -0.03 -10.31 0.15 -10.16 5.55
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New Zlnd 0.03 0.91 -0.35 -3.07 1.71 -1.36 2.27
Portugal -0.04 1.54 0.27 3.96 -1.22 2.74 -1.20
Spain -0.10 -5.24 1.37 2.63 -10.39 -7.75 2.51
Sweden 0.00 2.16 -0.22 0.68 1.24 1.92 0.24
Switzerland -0.12 3.00 0.60 7.73 -5.16 2.57 0.43
UK 0.02 -3.34 -0.20 -6.55 1.49 -5.06 1.72
USA -0.06 -3.02 -0.36 1.52 3.58 5.10 -8.12
MEDIAN -0.01 0.44 0.03 0.69 -0.21 0.05 0.19
MEAN -0.01 -0.27 0.10 0.40 -0.71 -0.31 0.03
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TABLE A.6 – Marginal Rates of Substitution: the Regression Evidence (OLS) 
 
  SET 1 SET 2 SET 3 SET 4
Regressor  Coef. T-ratio  Coef. T-ratio  Coef. T-ratio  Coef. T-ratio 
y81  0.000113 0.00 8.76E-05 0.00 -1.19061 -0.07 771.118 1.17
y82  -0.91797 -0.10 0.000202 0.00 -2.57942 -0.14 18.94526 0.11
y83  2.680376 0.30 3.278445 0.43 6.269392 0.33 18.94522 0.12
y84  4.58584 0.52 0.372243 0.05 -4.17194 -0.21 24.71677 0.16
y85  4.780879 0.54 3.565007 0.49 6.476922 0.33 27.29592 0.19
y86  9.306846 1.29 2.523869 0.36 7.748097 0.43 33.82624 0.23
y87  9.467775 1.32 3.084216 0.43 20.11692 1.42 35.23141 0.25
y88  10.10366 1.40 8.978649 1.21 24.12139 1.74 42.96791 0.30
y89  10.10381 1.39 3.084348 0.41 24.12149 1.73 42.96801 0.30
y90  10.10361 1.38 0.137102 0.02 24.12104 1.70 42.96805 0.29
y91  17.40111 2.40 -3.5532 -0.59 30.20061 1.82 47.43444 0.32
y92  13.48859 1.75 -0.81645 -0.13 30.20166 1.89 54.30442 0.37
y93  9.576935 1.20 4.656933 0.74 15.68026 0.91 61.17433 0.41
y94  6.533555 0.79 7.527573 1.07 20.48323 1.20 82.10986 0.52
y95  11.76353 1.34 10.73181 1.53 18.78389 1.20 467.1017 1.19
  40
y96  12.46779 1.52 10.73185 1.62 20.02031 1.30 430.7971 1.16
y97  16.5348 2.03 8.623888 1.36 20.10287 1.28 79.82599 0.51
y98  16.17249 1.98 6.017582 0.97 26.65097 1.68 66.60231 0.43
y99  15.77642 1.95 6.05066 0.99 36.30621 2.33 70.51673 0.46
y00  15.94322 2.23 2.500504 0.39 33.87834 2.15 57.79858 0.38
y01  16.93004 2.36 6.096086 0.95 30.1653 1.93 53.91909 0.35
y02  18.45323 2.57 6.047018 0.94 32.68562 2.04 41.19329 0.27
y03  18.75988 2.60 14.69234 0.95 35.79242 2.28 40.96398 0.26
y04  18.00477 2.26 3.904162 0.59 35.79234 2.32 40.96375 0.26
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epl  -31.7544 -1.85 -43.0982 -3.07 -81.0599 -1.61 331.0967 0.43
ud  0.752498 2.28 1.431212 4.70 0.011034 0.01 14.58667 1.20
uc  -0.36319 -2.06 -0.20645 -1.23 1.222105 2.15 3.295572 0.44
uncoord 4.911936 1.95 7.511706 3.34 7.269079 1.08 83.49915 1.59
brr  0.024052 0.07 0.183302 0.41 1.422629 1.57 12.50513 0.75
bd  24.22827 1.23 -67.2561 -3.00 206.798 3.80 -750.802 -1.22
ho  -0.52437 -0.87 -0.10312 -0.71 -5.46172 -2.66 -23.9459 -0.67
tax  3.314845 4.81 2.262147 5.34 3.408529 1.71 42.3166 1.15
pmr  -3.86075 -1.01 6.692781 1.62 -8.63052 -1.06 -158.752 -0.97
constant  46.39829 7.39 17.80336 3.40 88.63126 7.55 -4.42683 -0.03
   
R-square within 0.2726 0.3131  0.2687 0.1912
 between 0.0029 0.0842  0.001 0.0023
 overall 0.1756 0.2707  0.1741 0.1779
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TABLE A.7 – High Marginal Rates of Substitution: the Regression Evidence (Logit) 
 
  SET 1 SET 2 SET 3 SET 4
Regressor  Coef. T-ratio  Coef. T-ratio  Coef. T-ratio  Coef. T-ratio 
y81  -0.22402 -0.12 0.00036 0 3.9949 0.23 13.70643 0.01
y82  -0.30867 -0.16 -0.31706 -0.21 5.271348 0.68 13.33996 0.01
y83  0.772251 0.39 0.435385 0.27 5.530399 0.82 13.15702 0.01
y84  0.699812 0.31 -0.06608 -0.05 3.598774 0.55 8.449353 0.00
y85  0.605592 0.24 0.933707 0.71 5.324195 0.99 8.353503 0.00
y86  5.047934 1.49 1.250575 0.97 7.830979 1.66 8.206638 0.00
y87  3.823168 1.53 1.254863 0.97 10.48901 2.42 7.845911 0.00
y88  3.227332 1.27 2.341509 1.86 9.437009 2.02 9.345606 0.00
y89  2.492613 0.96 1.596721 1.28 7.778276 1.63 9.648235 0.00
y90  4.554983 1.29 1.370827 0.97 14.3423 5.02 11.17358 0.01
y91  11.32803 1.35 -0.24961 -0.17 11.31777 3.63 9.343211 0.00
y92  5.089241 1.83 0.436474 0.32 10.70441 2.70 10.22677 0.01
y93  2.324411 0.97 1.674835 1.23 8.922021 1.84 11.37032 0.01
y94  0.967334 0.42 2.528805 1.92 7.848464 1.31 12.63682 0.01
y95  0.827047 0.37 3.015918 2.29 6.353269 0.96 13.65361 0.01
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y96  2.041984 0.86 2.932292 2.25 6.847051 1.15 12.65503 0.01
y97  3.442315 1.5 2.510721 1.89 7.152481 1.28 12.66077 0.01
y98  3.859326 1.62 2.206297 1.63 9.023116 1.85 12.70653 0.01
y99  3.201486 1.39 1.682015 1.25 9.736009 1.92 14.14408 0.01
y00  3.030569 1.29 0.688976 0.49 8.958345 1.84 11.60815 0.01
y01  3.671034 1.52 1.689177 1.25 9.458615 1.93 11.60555 0.01
y02  3.933214 1.5 1.61892 1.2 11.51957 3.21 12.36682 0.01
y03  4.953222 1.58 0.912241 0.68 13.1469 2.47 12.64109 0.01
y04  2.41023 0.91 0.164617 0.1 15.04678 1.12 12.2278 0.01
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epl  -25.9307 -3.60 -9.77689 -3.22 -23.2752 -1.97 -24.2355 -3.51
ud  0.460866 1.78 0.293817 3.96 0.573345 0.90 0.146673 1.52
uc  0.14945 0.76 0.006364 0.18 0.746574 2.67 0.256289 3.48
uncoord 4.911936 2.34 2.10724 3.67 16.95037 1.85 2.863227 2.99
brr  0.334581 1.98 0.120708 1.65 0.89347 4.66 0.754064 4.70
bd  34.15239 3.00 -13.6597 -4.08 51.70375 -- 33.9857 3.13
ho  -1.02702 -1.79 0.155743 1.05 -1.45303 -2.65 -1.35292 -3.83
tax  0.499943 2.01 0.579056 4.15 0.902659 1.93 0.390487 1.95
pmr  0.431617 0.35 0.442421 0.73 -1.52924 -0.89 1.434376 1.65
constant  -0.22402 -0.12 0.00036 0 3.9949 0.23 13.70643 0.01
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TABLE A.8 – High Marginal Rates of Substitution: their Correlation with Efficiency (Logit) 
 
  SET 1 SET 2 SET 3 SET 4
Regressor  Coef. T-ratio  Coef. T-ratio  Coef. T-ratio  Coef. T-ratio 
y81  0.07167 0.05 -0.01406 -0.01 1.267976 0.78 0.807082 0.58
y82  0.165643 0.12 -0.03507 -0.03 1.264665 0.78 0.812127 0.58
y83  1.197396 0.84 0.270532 0.28 1.296639 0.80 0.810132 0.58
y84  1.534181 1.11 -0.10309 -0.11 1.377584 0.90 0.364876 0.27
y85  1.477917 1.08 0.26247 0.28 2.328237 1.53 0.232932 0.17
y86  2.201575 1.57 0.210328 0.23 2.241719 1.48 0.184043 0.14
y87  2.066372 1.49 0.216286 0.23 2.843487 1.82 0.188452 0.14
y88  1.920607 1.40 0.889616 0.97 2.753804 1.77 0.725126 0.56
y89  1.776769 1.31 0.242639 0.26 2.667655 1.73 0.728085 0.56
y90  1.596817 1.20 -0.09115 -0.10 2.542992 1.66 0.735836 0.57
y91  3.350456 2.08 -0.58674 -0.60 2.93479 1.91 0.653134 0.50
y92  2.199098 1.56 -0.19071 -0.20 2.97875 1.93 1.064084 0.84
y93  1.368319 1.06 0.444206 0.49 2.3724 1.59 1.425331 1.13
y94  0.99077 0.80 0.70321 0.78 2.549848 1.73 1.758614 1.40
y95  1.384435 1.11 1.044197 1.13 2.427734 1.66 2.077764 1.65
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y96  1.986748 1.54 1.059177 1.14 2.338078 1.60 1.416691 1.13
y97  2.766441 1.99 0.840262 0.91 2.357509 1.61 1.508375 1.19
y98  2.910592 2.11 0.529166 0.58 2.888653 1.93 1.522679 1.20
y99  2.745403 1.99 0.558022 0.61 3.717678 2.37 1.799898 1.44
y00  2.491284 1.75 0.101713 0.11 3.20251 1.95 1.279232 1.00
y01  3.056974 2.13 0.53622 0.58 2.957974 1.86 1.069813 0.84
y02  3.07994 2.01 0.541006 0.59 3.089157 1.89 1.063728 0.84
y03  2.963737 1.93 0.229265 0.25 3.359879 1.91 1.185861 0.92
y04  1.980355 1.44 0.406814 0.43 3.567792 1.96 1.175962 0.92
eff  -3.81745 -2.41 1.404649 1.09 -3.69571 -2.76 0.660252 0.49
constant  -0.22402 -0.12 0.00036 0 3.9949 0.23 13.70643 0.01
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TABLE A.9 – Efficiency Scores: the Regression Evidence (OLS) 
 
  SET 1 SET 2 SET 3 SET 4
Regressor  Coef. T-ratio  Coef. T-ratio  Coef. T-ratio  Coef. T-ratio 
y81  0.001872 0.04 0.009584 0.21 0.046943 0.67 0.04006 0.67
y82  0.01418 0.27 0.022966 0.51 0.034137 0.58 0.028179 0.57
y83  0.068343 1.04 0.065178 1.25 0.036998 0.59 0.029385 0.59
y84  0.075031 1.23 0.078844 1.63 0.038191 0.51 0.039567 0.67
y85  0.072273 1.24 0.076524 1.59 0.015899 0.23 0.023128 0.42
y86  0.065359 1.23 0.074307 1.58 0.000311 0.01 0.021693 0.42
y87  0.055302 1.11 0.067534 1.45 -0.01564 -0.27 0.012774 0.26
y88  0.043092 0.91 0.058982 1.28 -0.02899 -0.53 0.004735 0.09
y89  0.029918 0.66 0.048823 1.10 -0.04055 -0.77 -0.00101 -0.02
y90  0.012175 0.29 0.037379 0.90 -0.05592 -1.11 -0.01075 -0.23
y91  -0.00358 -0.09 0.029436 0.71 -0.06067 -1.16 -0.01305 -0.27
y92  0.002042 0.05 0.027095 0.62 -0.05071 -0.95 -0.01044 -0.21
y93  0.007627 0.18 0.03174 0.75 -0.0391 -0.76 -0.00727 -0.15
y94  0.028476 0.66 0.044878 1.06 -0.03288 -0.63 -0.00533 -0.11
y95  0.035196 0.76 0.063541 1.41 -0.02401 -0.42 0.009246 0.18
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y96  0.026379 0.59 0.064162 1.46 -0.04038 -0.74 -0.00348 -0.07
y97  0.020226 0.47 0.070599 1.63 -0.05305 -0.97 0.000328 0.01
y98  0.023633 0.54 0.048785 1.18 -0.05853 -1.12 -0.02339 -0.49
y99  -0.0043 -0.09 0.035973 0.88 -0.04835 -0.87 -0.03367 -0.73
y00  -0.0466 -0.97 0.013205 0.29 -0.10571 -1.97 -0.04754 -0.96
y01  -0.00443 -0.08 0.042948 0.87 -0.07201 -1.18 -0.02012 -0.37
y02  -0.03845 -0.71 0.014757 0.32 -0.10108 -1.72 -0.04028 -0.75
y03  -0.04477 -0.76 0.015441 0.31 -0.12872 -2.31 -0.07124 -1.47
y04  -0.04682 -0.73 0.028824 0.54 -0.12402 -2.12 -0.0635 -1.26
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epl  0.451348 3.61 0.447058 5.16 0.429015 3.22 0.49721 5.24
ud  0.003627 1.79 0.001641 1.05 -0.00339 -1.50 -0.00396 -2.28
uc  0.003326 2.28 0.003302 3.17 0.006639 5.35 0.005023 4.88
uncoord -0.01347 -0.76 -0.02193 -1.82 -0.02636 -1.35 -0.04072 -2.83
brr  0.002123 0.74 0.001274 0.63 0.008437 3.50 0.005284 2.74
bd  -0.12978 -1.05 0.136043 1.60 0.362892 2.65 0.31761 2.60
ho  -0.00064 -0.13 0.002889 2.22 -0.00623 -1.08 -0.00419 -0.93
tax  -0.01178 -2.71 -0.01171 -4.19 -0.01441 -2.99 -0.01156 -3.22
pmr  0.003437 0.13 0.004827 0.25 0.030697 1.52 0.040281 2.45
constant  0.64198 17.89 0.681921 17.78 0.652886 13.58 0.711898 16.05
  
R-square within 0.1831 0.2474 0.3719 0.4089
 between 0.0244 0.108 0.0037 0.0105
 overall 0.1473 0.215 0.3118 0.3657
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Legend of the Tables 
 
Ynn: common time (year) effect. 
Epl: Employment protection legislation data from the OECD 
labour market statistics database using version 1 of the indicator: 
the strictness of employment protection legislation. 
Ud: Union density is Union membership/Employment and was 
calculated using administrative and survey data from the OECD 
labour market statistics database. Series extended by splicing in 
data from Visser (2006).  
Uc: Union coverage, referring to the number of workers covered by 
collective agreements normalised on employment. Series 
constructed as an interpolation of both the Ochel (2001) and the 
OECD (2004) data. 
Uncoord: Index of lack of bargaining coordination. It is 
constructed from the index of bargaining coordination with range 
{1,5} taken from OECD (2004), Table 3.5. It is decreasing in the 
degree of coordination in the bargaining process on the employers’ 
as well as the unions’ side. 
Brr: Gross benefit replacement rates data are provided by OECD 
with one observation every two years for each country. In this case 
the data refer to the first year of unemployment benefits, averaged 
over three family situations and two earnings levels. The benefits 
are a percentage of average earnings before tax. 
Bd: Benefit duration index. This index is constructed as bd = 
0.6*brr23/brr1 + 0.4*brr45/brr1. This captures the level of benefits 
available in the later years of a spell relative to those available in 
the first year. 
Ho: Housing owner occupation rate based on data by Oswald 
(1996) and OECD (2005). 
Tax: Average effective tax wedge. Ex-post wedge computed from 
national accounts taken from Nicoletti institutions data. 
Pmr: The OECD indicators of regulatory reform summarise 
regulatory provisions in seven non-manufacturing sectors: 
telecoms, electricity, gas, post, rail, air passenger transport, and 
road freight. The range is {0,6}, increasing in regulation. 
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